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CONFINEMENT OF THE INSANE.
CONFINEMENT OF THE INSANE.
The time is almost within the memory of living persons
when it was deemed not only lawful but proper to confine
persons afflicted with mental disease in dungeons and with
chains, and to subject them to beating, at the discretion of
their keepers, in order to subdue their senseless fury and
drive away their delusions.! The notions of an ignorant
and barbarous age justified such treatment, but the common
law on the subject has been so much modified in the greater
intelligence of the present century that opinions as to how
much of the old rules remain must be expressed with some
degree of hesitation. Moreover, new cases are constantly
arising so peculiar as to convince us not only that much yet
remains to be learned on the general subject of insanity,
but also that it is difficult to prescribe, either judicially or
by statute, the proper rules for the government, care, and
custody of the unhappy persons who are afflicted with
mental disorder.
We commonly find in this country that insane persons are
cared for in one of the following ways -
I. By friends in their own homes, or in families who con-
sent to receive them for care and protection.
2. In private asylums, to which they are consigned by
friends, who pay for the care and attention that is given
them and provide for their various needs.
3. In public almshouses, to which they have been taken
as paupers, and where they are detained only as a conven-
ient method whereby the State may provide for their neces-
sities, and discharge the obligation of the State to furnish
them with food, clothing, and shelter.
4. In asylums established by the State, where they will
1 2 Roll. Abr. 546; Lofft, 243.
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receive such medical care and attention as is calculated to
restore to health the curable cases, and where the incurable
can be made as comfortable as the nature of the case will
permit.
In whichever of these methods the insane are provided
for, the confinement will have in view one. or all of the
following objects: Medical treatment of the person, with a
view to restoration to health; provision for his comfort and
physical welfare; protection of the public against dangerous
manifestations of his disease. Of confinement in the com-
mon almshouses or poor-houses of the country, we need only
remark that it is a barbarous method of treating this unfor-
tunate class of people, for the reason that it places them
in charge of persons not selected for any fitness to deal
properly with them, and who will commonly be incapable
of judging of any but mere physical needs. It makes no
proper provision for treatment with a view to possible res-
toration to health, and is likely to subject insane persons to
abuses from rough keepers, who will impute to evil pas-
sions the conduct attributable to mental disease. Happily
this imperfect and cruel method of discharging a public
duty is rapidly giving way to more wise and humane treat-
ment in public asylums.
When the going at large of an insane person is dangerous
to others, it is agreed on all hands that any person may
arrest him and place him under restraint.' The right to do
this is the same as the right to arrest persons actually
engaged in committing crimes of violence, and the restraint
is an act of self-defence by society through one of its mem-
bers. But such an arrest is a mere temporary expedient;
the party making it judges of the necessity at his peril,
being liable for all mistakes, and he must continue the
restraint without legal process only until more regular pro-
ceedings can be taken. As was said by Chief Justice Shaw
in one case, the necessity which creates the law that justifies
x Colby v. Jackson, 12 N. H. 526; Lott v. Sweet, 33 Mich. 308; Williams
v. Williams, 4 Thomp. & C. 251 ; Scott v. Wakem, 3 Fost. & Fin. 328; Symm
v. Frazer, 3 Fost. & Fin. 859. See Rex v. Gourlay, 7 Barn. & Cress. 669.
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him creates also the limitations of the law;I and in contem-
plation of law no restraint by mere private authority can be
deemed necessary after opportunity has been afforded for
judicial proceedings.2 Strangers have no right whatever to
arrest and confine a person whose going at large is not
dangerous to others, unless they have the authority of judi-
cial process.
The right of friends to put an insane person under restraint
is the same with the right to treat any sick person who is
incapable of acting for himself, with a view to his restoration
to health, with the superadded right of self-defence. The
difficulties in such cases arise mainly from the uncertainties
which often attend the question of actual mental unsound-
ness, and the conflicting claims of friends to the custody
of the person, or to determine what that custody and the
accompanying treatment shall be.
In a considerable proportion of cases of alleged mental
aberration there is controversy respecting the fact. The
supposed insane person will dispute it, -sometimes with no
little vigor and shrewdness; friends may disagree respect-
ing it, and the general public-who will in most cases
know little on the subject-will be likely to have impres-
sions of the party's real condition derived as much from
the supposed motives of those who make the allegation
as from any known facts. A husband supposed to be harsh
and tyrannical, who undertakes to put his wife under re-
straint as an insane person, is likely to find her relatives and
the general community instinctively arrayed against him,
and the case is prejudged upon prejudices. Indeed, when
the most regular investigations are entered upon, the ques-
tion of mental unsoundness is surrounded by so many diffi-
culties that the most conscientious and intelligent experts
are sometimes found unwilling to express positive opinions;
and when they express them, any two may draw different
conclusions from the same facts, according as they occupy
I Matter of Oaks, 8 Law Rep. 122; The Commonwealth v. Kirkbride, 2
Brews. 586. 2 Colby v. Jackson, 12 N. H. 526.
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different stand-points in respect to the surroundings. Neither
legal nor medical science has any definite test whereby to
judge of the existence of mental disease; and the law author-
ities are not agreed as to the persons who, as witnesses, may
express opinions on the facts given in evidence. Some are
of opinion that any one who has had opportunity to observe
actions may testify as to the impression of the mental condi-
tion which these made upon him; x while others confine the
testimony, as to opinions, exclusively to those authorized to
speak as experts.2  But the question who are experts, is
almost as difficult as any other, and is likely in any case
to complicate the legal problem. A medical practitioner
may or may not have had the experience to render him
expert in such cases; and it has sometimes been urged that
clergymen, whose office makes it their duty to administer
consolation to the sick and the dying, and to observe their
mental condition, ought, after considerable experience, to
be received as experts also; 3 but this view is open to grave
objections.
The question who, as a friend, is entitled to place a sup-
posed non compos under restraint, is likely to come in con-
troversy whenever the disease is denied; and also in other
cases, where parties near in relationship may have conflicting,
x See the authorities to this effect collected by Doe, J., in The State v.
Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 409. Also Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa. St. 216; Dickinson
v. Dickinson, 61 Pa. St. 4o; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. St. 351; Hathaway v.
Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335; Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459; The State v'.
Stickney, 41 Iowa, 232; Holcomb v. The State, 41 Texas, 125; Beller v.
Jones, 22 Ark. 92.
2 The Commonwealth v,. Wilson, I Gray, 337; The Commonwealth v.
Rich, 14 Gray, 335; The Commonwealth v. Fairbanks, 2 Allen, 511; Board-
man v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 12o; The State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399; Wyman
v. Gould, 47 Me. 159; Real v. The People, 42 N. Y. 270. In New York
the true rule is said to be that "a layman, when examined as to facts within his
own knowledge bearing on the question of sanity, may be permitted to char-
acterize the acts to which he testifies as rational or irrational. He may testify
to the impression produced by what he witnessed, but he is not legally com-
petent to express an opinion on the general question whether the mind of the
individual be sound or unsound." O'Brien v,. The People, 36 N.Y. 276, 282,
following earlier cases.
3 In re Toomes's Estate (Sup. Ct. Cal.), 12 Ch. Leg. N. 374.
HeinOnline  -- 6 S. L. Rev. n. s. 571 1880-1881
CONFINEMENT OF THE INSANE.
contingent, or presumptive interests in the property, or for
other reasons might suspect each other's motives. Parents,
no doubt, are the proper persons to take charge, as his
friefids, of an unmarried insane child, and their judgment of
what his case demands should be entitled to the highest
respect, and in most cases be conclusive. But parents, by
their previous behavior to him, may have deprived them-
selves of all equity to this control, and others farther
removed in kin may be nearer in kindness. But with the
best and kindest motives, it may be found that their judg-
ments cannot be harmonized. So children ought to decide
for-insane parents; but when they disagree, shall one be at
liberty to release the parent as often as the other restrains
him? The husband may, no doubt, judge for the wife, and
the wife for the husband," but the judgment cannot be con-
clusive; and the kindred of a wife whose husband should
plac'e her under restraint as a lunatic would have an
undoubted right to bring his judgment to a judicial test,
and in many cases would be inexcusable if they failed to
do so. A power of final decision in either spouse would be
so dangerous that grave abuses might be counted upon with
'certainty, and it might sometimes be found-as it has been
heretofore- that the sane person was imprisoned, with the
insane as keeper. Indeed, there is no class of cases so lia-
ble to the suspicion of improper motives, and of false and
fabricated appearances, as those in which the allegation of
insanity is made by husband or wife against the other, and
none in which there is so often occasion for legal inter-
ference. But if the spouse by marital right may confine,
and the father or mother by right of kin may release at dis-
cretion, the case would be left for decision to a species of
mob law, and the party who could rally the largest and most
reckless force would hold and control the unhappy person
who was the subject of contention. Such a condition of
things would be worthy of mediaeval barbarism.
Common sense would seem to dictate that the mere fact
of insanity should be no excuse for confinement, where the
' Davis v. Merrill, 47 N. H. 208; Denny v. Tyler, 3 Allen, 225.
HeinOnline  -- 6 S. L. Rev. n. s. 572 1880-1881
CONFINEMENT OF THE INSANE.
authority is only that of kinship or affinity. The harmless
lunatic whose peculiar vagaries threaten injury to the person
or property of no one, it would seem, ought to be entitled to
assert his right to liberty as against any one who would sub-
ject him to a restraint which neither the public protection
nor his individual advantage required., But restraint may
always be made beneficial while there is a prospect of cure,
and in any case the confinement of the most harmless non
compos may be justified if it is had in an asylum specially
designed for the comfort of such persons, and where their
needs can be better provided for than in a private family. It
has been said in one case that indefinite restraint for the
purposes of medical treatment can only be made lawful by
judicial proceedings; 2 but no court would interfere if the
mental disease was proved, and if the patient was receiving
treatment that seemed intelligent, judicious, and kind.3
It is a striking illustration of the uncertainties surrounding
this general subject, that an officer in one of the leading
States, whose duty requires him to have a general super-
vision of the treatment of insane and incompetent persons,
and who has written much, and with large information and
experience, on the subjects requiring his attention in his
office, appears to hold the opinion that when once a person
diseased in mind is confined by his friends in a private
house, the State can exercise no supervision of the case, or
in any manner interfere, until some overt act of wrong-doing
is made out.4 The reason assigned is that the Constitution of
See Look v. Dean, io8 Mass. 116.
Colby v. Jackson, 12 N. H. 527.
3 Denny v. Tyler, 3 Allen, 225; Davis v. Merrill, 47 N. H. 208.
4 ", Although it is against the danger of indefinite detention in custody,
whether public or private, of an alleged lunatic that the law is most jealously
watchful, it is nevertheless a fact that under the Constitution (Art. IV. of
Amendments, guaranteeing protection to private houses against unreasonable
searches) there is no legal method of testing the necessity for a continued
detention of any alleged lunatic in the custody of his relatives, either in his
own or in their private house. Until an act of overt wrong be alleged against
them, no presumption of such arises from time alone. If the party has once
been so insane as to justify restraint, we have at present no legal means of
ascertaining whether his insanity still continues, or whether it has ceased and
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the United States, in one of its amendments, guarantees the
citizen against "unreasonable searches and seizures," and
makes his house his castle. But this is a grave mistake.
Waiving the facts that the provision in the Federal Constitu-
tion is designed as a security against Federal action only,'
and that the Federal government has not been given author-
ity for the protection of rights in the domestic relations,2 it
seems sufficient to say here that a "search" with a view to
determine whether a sane person is wrongfully deprived of
his liberty under the pretence of insanity, must be one of
the most reasonable that can possibly be suggested, and that
a State having an officer to whom the supervision of cases
of insanity is committed, not only may provide, but ought
to provide, as a regulation of police, that every such case
shall be subject to his frequent inspection. No privacy is
so sacred that the reasonable police regulations of the State
may not inspect it; no "castle" is so impenetrable that its
keeper may close its gates against the State when it de-
mands entrance to inquire after one of its citizens confined
therein without judicial process. No doubt legislation would
be needful to impose on the officer the duty of examination,
and upon the keeper the obligation of submission to it; but
the power of legislation is ample, and without it the writ of
habeas cor pits may be sent into any dwelling, and it may be
issued on the application of any friend who believes the
restraint unwarranted,3 or even of a stranger. 4 It is imma-
terial whether the confinement was unlawful in the begin-
ning, or has only become so by a change of circumstances.
his custodians are now trespassers." Ordronaux's Judicial Aspects of Insanity.
53- "Necessarily, therefore, no public supervision can now be exercised over
lunatics in their own houses, or in those of a relative; for the law cannot intrude
upon the privacy of domestic life, nor change its character, until some overt
act of wrong has been committed. Const. U. S., Art. IV. of Amendments.
It is under this indefeasible right that the privacy of every citizen's house is
guaranteed against unlawful violation. It is in fact his castle." _1bid. 56.
z Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 7
Wall. 321; Cooley's Const. Lim. ig, and cases cited.
2 Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103; Ex parte Barry, 2 How. 65.
3 Cobbett's Case, 15 Q. B. 181, note.
4 Hottentot Venus Case, 13 East, 195.
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Even a private citizen who should assume that a sane person
was thus unlawfully confined, and should forcibly break in
for his release, would incur no greater responsibility than the
custodian himself; for each would be justified if the facts
were as he assumed them to be, and each would be a tres-
passer if they were otherwise. But the supervision of the
State would not be confined to a determination of the ques-
tion of sanity; it should extend to the whole treatment, and
it should in many cases permit participation in supervision
by other friends than the one in charge,- not merely as it
might be for the benefit or comfort of the person confined,
but for the quieting of any concern on their part respecting
the nature of the care bestowed.
It is expected, however, that insane persons will com-
monly be secluded in asylums specially adapted to their
needs, not only because this is most convenient for friends
and most safe for the community, but also because curable
cases can be best treated there, and incurable be made most
comfortable. In foreign countries, asylums are not gener-
ally provided by the State, but are licensed, and certain
precautions are established with a view to insure good faith
and prevent abuse. The chief of these is that the certifi-
cate of one or more reputable physicians to the fact of
insanity shall be furnished to the keeper when the person is
delivered over. This certificate is based upon an examina-
tion of which the subject will commonly be ignorant, and
his first knowledge that one has been made will be derived
from the forcible possession taken of his person.
The idea that one's liberty can be certified away without
his knowledge and without an opportunity to contest the
grounds of the certificate, is naturally shocking to the mind,
and the most satisfactory reasons of necessity ought to be
required to reconcile one to it. But it is easy for the pro-
cedure under such a law to be worse than the law itself; and
there is a widespread belief that in many cases the investi-
gation is but a farce, and scarcely goes beyond inquiry of
the person applying for the certificate, - the latter being in
fact given by the physician without any personal knowledge
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whatsoever of the facts attested. It may seem impossible
that physicians entrusted with a duty so important should
be so criminally confiding and so heedless of obligation;
but the fact has sometimes been established on their own
testimony when their conduct has been made the subject
of judicial examination and the certificate has proved untrue
in fact.', A person who from his youth has been familiar
with the principles of the common law cannot fail instinc-
tively to protest against such a system as being so vicious in
principle that abuses are natural to and invited by it. To
him the right to a judicial investigation seems a matter of
course.
The professional training of physicians, however, inclines
them to object to such investigations, as being unnecessary
in most cases and likely to be highly injurious. A writer in
one of the leading law journals of the country, some ten
years ago, stated the reasons for this objection with more
fulness and force than we find them elsewhere expressed,
and we copy his language. After giving reasons against
certain other tribunals, and supposing an intelligent com-
mission appointed for the purpose of the investigation, he
proceeds: "Any good which the procedure may possibly
accomplish would be obtained at the sacrifice of many
important objects,- for observe how it would work prac-
tically in a case of acute mania as it often appears. The
patient is noisy, boisterous, and self-sufficient, bent on going
out about his business, and threatening violence to all who
endeavor to prevent it. He refuses proper food and medi-
cine, perhaps insists on having stimulants, and requires the
unremitting attention of two or three men. The house is in
confusion, the family are frightened, attendants are obtained
with difficulty, and every day reveals some fresh phase of
the trouble. Endurance is possible no longer, and applica-
tion is made to the commissioner. He appoints a day for
hearing the case, and notice is given accordingly in the
Anderson v. Burrows, 4 Car. & P. 21o. This case holds the physician
personally responsible in such a case. And see Hall v. Semple, 3 Fost. &
Fin. 337.
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public papers. Counsel appear for the patient and solicit
more time for preparation. Of course the request must be
granted, and another week or ten days of -agony, care, and
anxiety must be endured. At the trial, the affairs of the
family are laid open to the public gaze, -the actions and
the discourse of the patient are described in his presence by
those who would, in the natural course of things, regard
them as something they were bound by every sentiment of
honor and propriety to conceal; and when at last the com-
missioner signs the order for his admission to the hospital,
he goes with redoubled excitement, and with tenfold hos-
tility to those who have never ceased to love and protect
him. If the patient is really insane, -and such is admitted
to be the fact in the great majority of cases,- what method
could be better calculated to exasperate him to fury, and on
recovery to overwhelm him with mortification and shame?"
In view of these objections, the writer declares that "it be-
comes a fair question whether we can do better than to
retain the old method whereby the friends assumed the
management of the case, acting according to their best
judgment under the advice of friends and physicians, and
legalize it by a statutory enactment."'
This is a vivid picture of an extreme case. We have
already seen that the common law permits the friends to
subject an insane person to restraint; but when they con-
fine him, it is at their peril if the fact is not as they assume.2
An enactment in aid of their common-law right might be
desired, first, to prevent the interference of others; second,
to render it compulsory that the keepers of. asylums should
receive the patient when brought there; third, to exempt all
parties concerned from responsibility in case the alleged
insanity should be disproved. To make it fully effectual,
the judgment of friends upon the case should be made final.
But to this there are objections on the score alike of expe-
diency, justice, and constitutional right. Friends, as has
already been said, may not always -agree, either upon the
z Am. L. Rev., vol. 3, PP. 193, 213.
Fletcher v. Fletcher, x El. & El. 420.
voL. v1. NO. 4. 37
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fact of insanity or upon the course that should be taken
when its existence is conceded. Moreover, the persons who
would decide are sometimes interested in making a false
accusation for some dishonest end. This most often hap-
pens in the marital relation, but by no means exclusively;
and when it does happen, leaving the decision to the party
interested violates the first principles of common right and
just government. The alternative, if there is to be no judi-
cial investigation, must be statutory provision for some
examination that shall be sufficient and at the same time
avoid the evils so forcibly depicted as likely to attend a
judicial inquiry.
These evils, shortly stated, are: first, that notice is pub-
licly given; second, that the hearing is delayed for prepara-
tion to defend; third, that family matters and the conduct
.of the respondent are inquired into in public; fourth, that
by these the party is excited; fifth, that in case of subse-
quent cure, the recollection of these overwhelms the party
with mortification and shame. To avoid these, then, the
statutory investigation must be,first, secret; second, without
delay for defence; and third, without bringing out matters
it might be supposed the respondent, if sane, would choose
to conceal. But it would be ridiculous to call this an inves-
tigation. If the party is unquestionably insane, this may
answer, because nothing more than mere form can then be
needed; but assuming this is assuming the needlessness of
any such enactment. An investigation supposes an inquiry
into unknown facts, and assumes that there may be more
than one side or aspect to the subject investigated; but
if the proceeding is to be managed by one party only, and
the party principally concerned is to be kept in ignorance
of what is going on, it is worse than a misnomer to call it
an investigation, for the result must be foredoomed in all
cases which are not too plain for doubt. The officer investi-
gating will see what the moving party desires him to see;
and friends who may know of countervailing facts are likely
to be kept in ignorance of the proceeding until the result is
reached and the purpose executed. Apply similar proceed-
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ings in other cases, and what wife would be secure in her
rights whom the husband saw fit to divorce? what accused
party would escape whom the State wished 'to convict, or
be convicted when the government chose to shield him?
It is often complained that there is an unhealthy sentiment
in the public mind on this subject, which has been created
by writers of fiction, and which leads to our viewing the
proceedings in these cases with unreasoning suspicion. To
some extent this is true; but fiction would have done little
to influence the public mind if it had not been felt that
truth lay at the foundation. 'When, as the result of an
inquiry which is as likely to be set on foot by malice or
cupidity as by affection, an eccentric, nervous, and excit-
able person, who is perfectly sane notwithstanding his pecu-
liarities, is seized without warning, dragged by force from
his home, secluded from society in an asylum devoted by
law exclusively to persons of disordered intellect, and there
retained with the treatment of a madman, against his will,
while he is smarting under a sense of outrage at the hands
of those who should have shielded and cherished him, and
is intensely concerned about property and business affairs,
which without his consent have been taken from his hands
and committed he knows not to what management, - per-
haps to the person of all others he specially distrustg, - and
while he feels confident that he might disprove the horrible
charge under which he is confined, if he were allowed the
fundamental right of defence which is conceded to the most
petty, offender, is there not a certainty that any excitement
he before exhibited will be redoubled by his treatment?
that any ill-will he before may have indulged for members
of his family concerned in it will be increased many fold?
that the treatment will have a direct and positive tendency
to unsettle the mind? and that, finally, if he shall be fortu-
nate enough to escape both insanity and the imprisonment,
he will be "overwhelmed with mortification and shame"
that those near to him in blood or affinity could be guilty
of such unnatural and horrible cruelty? Now, such a case
is not only possible, but it is one likely to occur when the
HeinOnline  -- 6 S. L. Rev. n. s. 579 1880-1881
CONFINEMENT OF THE INSANE.
motive to bring it about is sufficiently powerful; and it is
idle to expect that the care and caution of asylum-officers
will constitute perfect protection against it, for they receive
their patient with all presumptions and appearandes against
him, and will in most cases be slow in detecting the fraud,
and never detect it if the outrage results in the condition
of mind which it presupposes. Suppose the case be but
one in a thousand; what right has the State to sacrifice thus,
the rights, liberty, perhaps the mind itself, of the thousandth
man for an assumed benefit to others? But the evils neces-
sarily attending public examinations are enormously exag-
gerated; they are no doubt considerable in exceptional
cases, but there are countervailing benefits even when insan-
ity exists. When the patient retains his sense of right and
wrong, the excitements of a trial conducted according to
forms which he knows are established for effecting justice,
before a tribunal which the community is accustomed to
respect and obey, are likely to be far less violent and dis-
turbing than a certificate frQm one who has condemned him
unheard, and whose conclusion he fancies would have been
different if he had been allowed the ordinary privileges
which are accorded as of common right to every culprit.
It is certainly remarkable that so many, when insanity is
in question, deem it reasonably safe to allow the judgment
to be founded on a private inquisition managed by one side
of the controversy only, and where family history, peculiari-
ties, and controversies will be brought out only so far as the
managers see fit to disclose them. These, in fact, are the
important res gest, and to keep them from coming into con-
troversy lest they may be mortifying, is to shut the eyes to
facts that may be controlling. In many cases the mental
condition can only be established by a series of facts and
circumstances and acts and conduct extending over a con-
siderable period of time ;" and as a matter of common obser-
vatioi we know that in almost every case involving property
rights or criminal conduct, experts draw different conclu-
1 Anderson v. The State, 43 Conn. 514, 519.
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sions from the state of facts presented by the respective
parties to the controversy. For example, in a will case,
the proponent presents his evidence, and then, stating his
hypothesis, asks the expert whether, supposing it to be true,
the decedent, in his opinion, was sane, The answer being
favorable, the contestant presents the hypothesis his evi-
dence tends to support, and asks the same question of the
same witness, and is answered in the negative. The same
expert, therefore, would find insanity or sanity according as
he believed one story or the other to be true; and yet they
may differ perhaps in particulars which a layman might
overlook, and which even a fair examination, if ex parne,
might not bring out at all. When, therefore, we assume
that insanity is easily and readily discovered, with slight
probability of error, we assume what the experience of
experts, both legal and medical, is constantly disproving.
Reasons for a judicial investigation may be thus enu-
merated -
I. Only thereby will the facts which tend to disprove
insanity be brought to light in obscure and doubtful cases;
and those are the very cases in which the danger of fearful
and disastrous mistakes are likely to occur. And these
mistakes, if they lead to insanity, may never be discovered
even by conscientious and careful keepers, who will see
their patients under the bias of an established charge, and
will find in the very intensity of their sense of outrage some
evidence of deranged intellect.
2. When an insane person retains his sense of justice and
fair dealing, - as he usually does,' - the regular investiga-
tion is quite as apt to soothe as to excite him.3. The public investigation is important for its effect upon
the public mind. When a citizen is suddenly abducted and
conveyed to a place of indefinite confinement, without any
public investigation of cause, the public, unless prepared for
it by previous knowledge, is likely to be startled, and to be
reminded of horrible possibilities. Fair minds, unless the par-
x Ordronaux's Judicial Aspects of Insanity, Introd. xxxiv.
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ties concerned have a well-known reputation for undoubted
integrity, and are without conceivable motive for injustice in
the particular case, are likely to feel strongly that such fear-
ful consequences should only attend the fullest investigation
by an impartial tribunal that hears all sides. The existence
of distrust in such cases is a great public evil; for while it
is important that there should be satisfaction with the law in
all cases, it is especially so when it affects the cases of help-
less persons.
4. Full and public inquiry is important to the protection
of managers of asylums. We do not now have in view any
legal responsibility which they may incur by reason of
mistakes in receiving or detaining patients who are really
sane, but to responsibility or suffering by reason of false
accusations made by patients in respect to treatment in the
asylum, Take for illustration a not uncommon case. A
woman is dismissed as cured from one of our best-regulated
asylums. She publishes, on her release, a most pathetic
story of wrong, beginning with her incarceration while sane,
at the instance of interested parties, and followed by brutal
treatment while her seclusion continued. No doubt she
believes the story, and she will have no difficulty in im-
pressing the belief upon a considerable portion of the com-
munity. It will be in vain that the friends of the asylum
call attention to the fact that the diseased imagination
frequently pictures upon the mind atrocities that never oc-
curred, and that the predisposition of the public to believe in
their truth has come from the reading of sensational fiction;
the fact of belief will remain, and it will cause all parties
concerned much unhappiness, if not litigation and loss. A
preliminary public examination before a competent tribu-
nal would establish a prima facie case which such a story
could n6t shake, and the officers of the asylum might rely
upon it with confidence for their protection against unjust
censure.
Our asylums for the insane are great public charities, and
it is of the highest importance that they have the entire con-
fidence of the public. Every thing that is reasonable should
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be done to establish a conviction that they are places for the
tender care of the unfortunate, and that they never become
places of torment for the victims of malice, cupidity, or mis-
take. We cannot be too careful here; and if there exist
unreasonable prejudices in the community, we cannot wisely
or safely disregard them or set them at defiance. While
they exist they will do mischief, and we can only overcome
them by removing the causes from which they arise.
And here it may be well to refer to the fact that it is
sometimes found that an impression prevails among those
connected with the management of asylums that the person
who has caused the seclusion of a patient has some special
right of control to the exclusion of other friends. For ex-
ample, in a State asylum to which a husband had caused his
wife to be restrained, a parent called to see her recently, and
was denied the privilege. Pressing for a reason, which at
first was denied him, he discovered at last that it was because
the husband had forbidden it. The asylum was one repu-
tably and conscientiously managed, but the keepers believed
the husband had the power he assumed to exercise. In fact,
every such patient is the ward of the State while in its charge,
and the duty of the officers is to consult her interest exclu-
sively, without being influenced by the wishes, feelings, and
resentments which might prevail among her relatives.
We fully concede that in the statutes which provide for a
judicial investigation little wisdom has generally been shown.
The case is not a proper one for jury trial, and in the absence
of statutes, would be disposed of in the Court of Chancery.'
Nor is it a proper one to be left to an inferior magis-
trate, who from his education and opportunities may have
acquired no fitness for such an inquiry. The hearing is one
of the most important that any court can ever be required to
enter upon, and it should be conducted by a tribunal spe-
cially created for the purpose, or by one of the superior courts.
The question of guardianship has no necessary connection
with it; the adjudication of insanity may well be required
x Smith v. Carll, 5 Johns. Ch. iS.
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for the sole purpose of determining the need and advisability
of restraint under the advantages which an asylum may offer.
5. A minor but not unimportant reason for a judicial deter-
mination is that the party removing the patient to an asylum
will then have conclusive evidence of his right in writing and
under official seal, and can exhibit it to those who demand
it, and should exhibit it on demand. It is not impossible,
under the practice generally prevailing, for a person who is
perfectly sane to be seized and carried for considerable dis-
tances on public conveyances and finally removed there-
from on the pretence of taking him or her to an asylum,
when the actual purpose is altogether different and perhaps
criminal. The interference of others is prevented by assur-
ances that the person is insane; and the more indignantly
and vehemently this is denied, the more likely it is to be
believed. There is a common belief that such cases of the
abduction of women sometimes occur; and it is certain that
insane persons are frequently taken by force to asylums,
when the only evidence the public have of their condition is
the word of those in charge of them. This proves how easily
an outrage like the one suggested may be perpetrated.
That one is of right entitled to a trial before his insanity can
be taken as conclusively established against him, is unques-
tionable. No certificate of a physician, however honestly
given, can determine the fact, for the physician possesses no
part of the State judicial power. His fiat cannot be "due
process of law," to deprive any man of his liberty. Those
who act upon it may use it as an item of evidence in making
out good faith, but it cannot protect them if it proves mis-
taken and untrue, and no legislative power could make it
protect them.' In England, a Parliament unfettered by con-
It seems to have been once held in Pennsylvania, in a case in which
relatives were sued for confinipg in an asylum an alleged lunatic, that if defend-
ants "acted under such circumstances as would have induced a man of ordinary
intelligence to have believed the plaintiff insane, and requiring medical treat-
ment in a hospital, then the plaintiff cannot recover." Hinchman v. Richie,
2 Law Rep. (N. S.) I8o, quoted in 47 N. H. 2io; but no other authority coun-
tenlances such a notion. Compare Fletcher v. Fletcher, i El. & El. 420; Van
Duesen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 142; Look v. Dean, ioS Mass. xx6.
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stitutional restraints may give protection to those concerned
in the confinement of a sane person, in reliance upon such a
paper, if it shall be deemed wise to do so; x but American
legislatures exercise a delegated authority, and the power to
legislate away the liberty of the citizen without the oppor-
tunity of a hearing has not been confided to them.2 And
it is proper to add that the approval of the physician's
certificate by a court of record, which has sometimes been
provided for by statute, is neither a hearing nor a substitute
for a hearing. It may strengthen the presumption that the
case is a proper one for restraint, but it cannot go further.3
The case of persons acquitted on criminal charges by
reason of insanity, requires perhaps more thoughtful attention
than it has hitherto received. The fact that the defence is
often a fraud, but nevertheless successful, comes in to com-
plicate the difficulty. Of course, if there was insanity at
the time of the alleged offence, a verdict of acquittal does
not prove that it still exists; but the verdict may neverthe-
less be prima facie evidence, sufficient to warrant confine-
ment until an investigation under judicial forms can be had.
But a party has a right to such an investigation, and the law
that provides for the confinement should afford the means
of obtaining it.4
THOMAS M. COOLEY.
x Mackintosh . Smith, 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 913.
2 Where, however, insanity in fact exists, the parties concerned in the arrest
and detention will not be liable merely because of-errors in attempting to com-
ply with legal forms. Matter of Shuttleworth, 9 Q. B. 651.
3 See Ex parte Jones, 30 How. Pr. 446.
4 Underwood v. The People, 32 Mich. i.
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